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ABSTRACT
Crossfire attack is a recently proposed threat designed to disconnect
whole geographical areas, such as cities or states, from the Internet.
Orchestrated in multiple phases, the attack uses a massively dis-
tributed botnet to generate low-rate benign traffic aiming to congest
selected network links, so-called target links. The adoption of be-
nign traffic, while simultaneously targeting multiple network links,
makes the detection of the Crossfire attack a serious challenge.
In this paper, we propose a framework for early detection of
Crossfire attack, i.e., detection in the warm-up period of the attack.
We propose to monitor traffic at the potential decoy servers and dis-
cuss the advantages comparing with other monitoring approaches.
Since the low-rate attack traffic is very difficult to distinguish from
the background traffic, we investigate several deep learning meth-
ods to mine the spatiotemporal features for attack detection. We
investigate Autoencoder, Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Network to detect the Crossfire
attack during its warm-up period. We report encouraging experi-
ment results.
1 INTRODUCTION
A novel class of an extreme link-flooding DDoS (Distributed Denial
of Service) attack [11] is the Crossfire attack [7]. It is designed to
cut off a targeted geographic region from the Internet by simul-
taneously targeting a selected set of network links [3], [2]. The
most intriguing property of this attack is the usage of legitimate
traffic flows to achieve its devastating impact by making the attack
particularly difficult to detect and, consequently, to mitigate [7].
In this paper, we propose a new detection approach that uses the
traffic volume (or intensity) on specific network regions for any sub-
tle changes on some of the links. Depending on the resolution of the
monitoring scheme, we show that this leads to an early detection
of the attack. In particular, we argue that monitoring the traffic of
the public servers near a target area could facilitate early detection.
We describe several deep learning based methods to extract useful
features from the traffic volume: Autoencoder, Convolutional Neu-
ral Network (CNN) and Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) network.
We show the feasibility of early detection in our simulation.
1.1 Crossfire attack
The Crossfire attack uses a massively large-scale botnet for attack
execution [7]. The success of the attack depends highly on the
network structure and how the attacker plans and initiates the
Figure 1: TheCrossfire attack trafficflows congest a small set
of selected network links using benign low-rate flows from
bots to publicly accessible servers, while degrading connec-
tivity to the target area.
attack sequence [12]. The attacker aims to find a set of target links,
which connects to the decoy servers such that if the target links
are flooded, traffic destined to the target area is prevented from
reaching its destination. Reciprocally, access from the target area
to Internet services outside the target area will be cut off.
For the adversary to achieve its goal, it chooses public servers
either inside of the target area or nearby the target area, which can
be easily found due to their availability. The quality of the attack
depends on the specific selection of servers and the resulting links
to be targeted.
The Crossfire attack consists of three phases: (a) the construc-
tion of the link map, (b) the selection of target links, and (c) the
coordination of the botnet. While phases (a) and (b) are sequentially
executed only initially, once triggered phase (c) is executed periodi-
cally. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of the Crossfire attack.
Link map construction: The attacker creates a map of the net-
work along the ways from the attacker’s bots to the servers using
traceroute [7].
Target links selection: After the construction of the link map, the
adversary evaluates the data for more stable and reliable routes to
decide on its selection of the target links.
Bot coordination: In the final phase of the attack, the adversary
coordinates the bots to generate low-intensity traffic and to send
it to the corresponding decoy servers. The targeted aggregation
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of multiple low-intensity traffic flows on the target link ideally
exhausts its capacity, hence, congesting the link.
Because the Crossfire attack aims to congest the target links with
low-rate benign traffic, neither signature based Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs) nor alternative traffic anomaly detectors are capable
of detecting malicious behavior of individual flows. The detectabil-
ity of the Crossfire attack can be further hardened by the attacker
(a) gradually increasing bot traffic intensities, (b) estimating the
decoy servers’ bandwidth to avoid exceeding their bandwidth, (c)
evenly distributing the traffic over the decoy servers, (d) alternating
the set of bots flooding a target link, and (e) alternating the set
of target links [7]. Although these techniques further sophisticate
the attack, the inherent complexities of the attack also create sub-
stantial execution obstacles, which exposes the attack to detection
vulnerabilities.
2 MONITORING AND DETECTION
APPROACH
Considering the described Crossfire attack execution sequence, we
argue that there are potentially four ways to detect the attack [? ]:
(a) detection at the traffic flows origin, i.e., bot sides, (b) detection
at the target area, (c) detection at the target link, and (d) detection
at the decoy servers. Following, we address the advantages and
disadvantages each of the four ways to finally justify our choice for
traffic monitoring.
• Detecting at the origin can be the fastest way to stop an attack
before even it is initiated. However, versatility and spatial
distribution of bots (source of the attack traffic) makes it the
most challenging option.
• Detection at the target area is the most reasonable approach
as any target areas should be equipped for self- defense.
However, assuming not all decoy servers are inside the target
area, early detection is impossible [11].
• Detection at the target link might be the simplest form of
detection as simple a threshold based detection system that
could detect the trend of the incoming traffic. However, the
locations of the target links may be unknown to the defender.
• Detection at decoy servers can be the best approach to detect
Crossfire attack. Assuming the target area is not far from the
decoy servers (3 to 4 hops [7]) detecting at the decoy servers
might reduce the impact of the attack.
Therefore, we propose to perform detection at the decoy servers,
because it is the exclusive area that the defender can detect the
attack while actively responding to it. To emphasize the effective-
ness of our detection approach at the decoy servers, we address the
question of where is the best location to probe the network. In a
high resolution, this probing can be placed either at the target link,
before or after the target link. Monitoring a single link as a target
link is not considered as a solution because of two reasons:
• Any links can be targeted for an attack. Therefore, there
should be a one-to-one detector for every link in the network.
However, in our proposal, there is only one detector but
many probing points.
• Monitoring and detecting based on a single link will fail in
distinguishing between link attack and flash-crowd.
Our main goal is to detect the Crossfire attack without the need
of having the target link information. Depending on the budget of
the adversary, the number of bots purchased for an attack can be
in the range of thousands to even millions. If the sources of the
attack traffic, i.e., bots, are geographically spread out, the variation
of the traffic volume on most of the links is very small (for many
routes, there might be only one or few attack flow before they
are aggregated at the target link). That leaves only few link closer
to a target link worth to examine. However, the chosen decoy
servers should not be very far away from the target area (if they
are not inside the target area). Since there is a smaller number of
destinations for the attack traffic than the number of sources of
generating them, it can be assumed that the variation of the volume
of the traffic caused by the attack traffic on the links after the target
link is higher than the links before the target link (even at the edge
of the network). Therefore, we propose to monitor links around
servers or data centers that can result in more successful detection
than around clients.
The approach of evenly distributing the traffic for decoy servers
[7], might even support the above reasoning and rather make it
simpler to detect some variation in the traffic volume on several
links. The important element in this method is to be able to monitor
the traffic at several links and send the information to a detector
for decision making.
3 ATTACK CHARACTERISTICS AND
EXPERIMENT SET-UP
Since our focus is on the detection of the attack, we ignore the first
few steps of the Crossfire attack such as link map construction,
finding link persistence, or target link selection. We assume that
all attack preparations have been made and the attacker is ready to
attack.
When the preparations have been made, to bring down the target
link, the bot-master initiates the attack by sending the attack order
to the Command and Control (C&C) server or some selected peers
depending on the structure of the botnet. Bots usually update each
other in a polling or pushing mechanism.
When designing Crossfire detection mechanisms, an often ig-
nored part of the Crossfire attack is the phase from the attack
initiation and the successful impact of the attack [7]. This often
ignored part of the Crossfire attack, which we call it warm-up pe-
riod, is the time difference between the time of the first bot- flow of
the attack reaches the target link and the moment the target link is
down. By definition, the attack actually happens at the end of the
warm-up period when the target links are down. Since, reaching a
zero time warm-up period is hard, this period can be used for early
detection and before the attack successfully takes place.
In fact, for several reasons reaching a zero warm-up time is hard.
One reason is the dynamic delay of packet arrival at the target link.
That could be because of variations of hop distances from bots to
target link, or the delay in receiving attack order from the adversary.
Any sudden significant change on traffic volume can be detected
by firewalls and IDSs. Therefore, adversaries gradually increase the
attack traffic volume to prevent being detected.
Another important parameter for generating the bot traffic is the
duration of the attack. The attack duration is the time difference
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between the end of the warm-up period and the end of the attack.
Usually, bot-masters (adversaries) tend to reduce the duration of the
attack to prevent being detected. In the case of the Crossfire attack,
a rolling mechanism is introduced to keep the attack at the data
plane (evade activating control plane which redirects the traffic)
[7]. In the rolling scheme, a set of target links are only used for
a specific period of time before switching to another set of target
links. The duration they used in the rolling scheme is 3 minutes or
less where 3 minutes is the keep-alive messages time interval for
the BGP algorithm.
To generate data for the training Crossfire detectors, we simulate
link utilizations of a network with 80 decoy servers under attack in
two different conditions. In the first case all the 80 decoy servers
are under attack and in the other case 70 decoy servers which are
randomly selected each time are under attack. We also study the
case when not all decoy servers are under attack as we cannot know
in advance exactly which all servers would the attacker target. We
sample the average link utilization every 1 minute. When not under
an attack, the servers have a background traffic which is simulated
by a random Gaussian process assuming the server is communicat-
ing with many clients. The background traffic for each server has a
different mean between 100Kbps-150Kbps and a standard deviation
between 0.45Kbps-2.45Kbps.
To simulate an Crossfire attack, an extra attack traffic is added
to the background traffic. The attack starts with a warm-up period
where the attack traffic slowly increases in intensity. The warm-up
duration is 30 minutes (samples). The warm-up period corresponds
to a randomized ramp function. When the attack manages to flood
the target link, the attack traffic reaches its peak and stays there till
the attack is over. The intensity of the low rate network traffic from
the bot for the attack ranges from 0.43Kbps-2.2Kbps. The dataset
for both the conditions has 6000 separate attack instances. The
data is labeled true only for the warmup period as we attempt to
do early detection before the attack has flooded the target links.
Figure 2 illustrates the link utilization for 2 decoy servers during
3 separate attack instances when all the decoy servers are under
attack. Note that it is difficult to distinguish the attack traffic from
the background traffic.
4 CROSSFIRE DETECTIONWITH DEEP
LEARNING
Crossfire attack poses numerous challenges for security researchers
and analysts both in detection and mitigation as the packets stream-
ing from bots in the network are seemingly legitimate. While the
objective of the Crossfire attack is to deplete the bandwidth of spe-
cific network links, a distinct traffic flow between each bot to server,
i.e., "bot-to-server" is usually very less intensive flow, and consumes
a limited bandwidth at each link. Thus detecting a single flow (or
very few number of them) at a link is hard to detect and filter. On
the defender’s side, Traffic Engineering (TE) is the network process
that reacts to link-flooding events, regardless of their cause [9]. The
goal of an attacker is to hide the variation of traffic bandwidth as
much as possible from the TE module.
Following this direction, we leverage deep learning approaches
to detect the Crossfire attack from available traffic data. Recently,
Figure 2: The simulated low-rate network utilization data
for 2 decoy server locations when all servers are under at-
tack. The link utilization is normalized to a range of 0-1with
0 and 1 corresponding to theminimum andmaximum of all
measurements respectively. Note that the low rate traffic in
the warm up period is very difficult to distinguish from the
background traffic.
Figure 3: Performance of Random Forest on temporal data
extracted by deep-autoencoder.
deep learning has achieved breakthrough results in many natu-
ral language processing and computer vision problems [1, 4, 8].
Here we investigate its usefulness and performance for traffic data
analysis to detect Crossfire attack in the early stage.
4.1 Deep Autoencoders
We investigate using deep-autoencoder [5] to extract intrinsic low-
dimensional information from the traffic. This is followed by Ran-
dom Forest for anomaly detection.
Here we propose a deep-autoencoder structure to exploit spa-
tiotemporal information. We uses a window of 5 consecutive time
steps by concatenating data from 5 consecutive samples. Each sam-
ple contains 80measurements that correspond to the traffic volumes
of the 80 decoy servers in the simulated network. Thus the input
dimension of the data for the autoencoder is 400. The autoencoder
contains 2 hidden layers and its structure is as such: (400)-390-370-
390-400. Figure 3 shows the area under the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve of this approach.
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Figure 4: The CNN architecture used to detect crossfire at-
tacks. The output layer is a binary predictor predicting the
two categories of attack and non-attack
4.2 Convolutional Neural Network
A Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) can be utilized for detect-
ing by considering the data as a 2 dimensional grid spanning across
time and decoy server dimensions. The dataset is divided into sepa-
rate windows with 80 servers we are monitoring as columns and
across 15 time steps as rows. We label the entire window as an
attack window if the warmup period of the attack occurs in at least
5 out of 15 time steps. The CNN is arranged in two separate convo-
lutional operations. The first step learns a convolutional filter that
spans only across the time axis(rows) and has dimension of 1 across
the server axis(columns). This filter is expected to learn the pattern
for the attack only in the time axis independent of the servers. We
call this as a temporal filter. The second convolutional filter spans
across all the 80 servers and a few rows. We call this as the spatial
filter as it extends through space for all the servers. This filter is ex-
pected to discover the correlation between different servers as they
are under attack at the same time. The intuitive reasoning behind
such a network configuration was validated by a hyperparameter
search across various configurations. The activation function used
is ReLu and to improve network performance each convolutional
step is batch normalized. A final fully connected layer with softmax
activation does a binary classification of the window as attack or
non-attack. The network architecture is demonstrated in figure 4.
The shape of the temporal filter is 9x1x16 (height x width x
depth). The spatial filter dimension is 6x80x20 (height x width x
depth). The filter strides for each case is 1. An Adam optimizer
with learning rate of 0.3x10-5 is used to train till the early stopping
condition. The dataset is divided into Training, Validation and Test
set in the ratio of 70:20:10.
The results on the test dataset for two different attack conditions
is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Performance of CNN.
Servers under attack Precision Recall F1 Score
80/80 0.74 0.97 0.84
70/80 0.759 0.788 0.773
4.3 Long Short-Term Memory Network
An LSTM[6] is used as a sequence classifier for detecting whether
each time sample is a warm-up period of Crossfire attack or not. We
Figure 5: The LSTM architecture for detecting Crossfire at-
tacks
use a stacked LSTM configuration having 2 consecutive LSTM cells
as shown in Figure 5. Each of the LSTM cells have 64 hidden units.
Each output sample from stacked LSTM is classified into an attack
or non-attack by a fully connected layer. The input to the LSTM
network are windows of 64 time samples of 80 dimensional vectors
for decoy traffic. Adam optimizer is used to train the network with
learning rate as 0.001 till the Early stopping condition.
To improve on the per sample prediction of learned LSTM and
also to exploit the fact that warm-up samples are consecutive, we
keep the history of the per sample prediction of LSTM Network in
a circular buffer of length 7. The scalar value in the buffer cell is 1
if there is an attack and 0 otherwise. Only if all the samples in the
buffer are attacks, do we finally predict an attack. This increases
latency in predicting an attack but dramatically increases attack
detection accuracy. With a buffer of length 7, we find that we can
predict almost perfectly for the warm-up period with a maximum
latency of 13 samples. The precision of the detector is 1.0 and recall
is 0.998, shown in Table 2. We can also trade-off between the latency
of detection and the performance of detection by changing buffer
size.
Table 2: Performance of LSTM.
Servers under attack Precision Recall F1 Score
80/80 1.00 0.998 0.999
70/80 0.995 0.964 0.979
5 CONCLUSIONS
The Crossfire attack is considered to be one of the most difficult
target-area link-flooding attacks to be detected. The attack uses
a distributed botnet to generate multiple low-rate benign traffic
flows aiming to congest selected network link with the ultimate
goal to disconnect the target area from the Internet. In this paper,
we have demonstrated the effectiveness of monitoring link utiliza-
tions at the decoy servers to detect Crossfire attacks. Out of the
different deep learning methods we have investigated, we find that
the LSTM detection approach achieves encouraging performance
under different attack conditions. For future work, we investigate
the performance under different network structures.
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